Port-Au-Prince Interna Airport
Aircraft Accident/Incident Report

Hinche
Sunday, March 14, 1999 19:45 EST

The accident flight departed Port-au-Prince International Airport (MTPP) on a moonless night, as the second helicopter that was tasked in an attempted emergency medevac rescue of a severely injured woman on the far north coast of Haiti. At the time of departure, the latest weather report was 2 1/2 hours old. The most direct route to the medevac pickup site was over mountainous terrain. The CVR and wreckage evidence indicate that the flightcrew had abandoned its attempt to get to the pickup site and had turned south in the direction of base, when the helicopter impacted near the top of a mountain ridge. The helicopter, a Mil Mi-8MTV-1 (Mi-8) was properly certificated and maintained in accordance with applicable regulations. No evidence of pre-impact fire was found, nor was any indication of systems, mechanical, or structural failure. Radio-navigation capability was needed with at least one ground station in Haiti, to attempt the emergency mission in the ambient conditions into which the helicopter was flown. However, aircraft-to-station compatibility did not exist. The Mi-8 was equipped with non-directional beacon (NDB) navigation receivers that were not compatible with the VOR instrument landing system at MTPP. Cap Haitien Airport, near the intended medevac pickup site, maintained an NDB radio beacon, but was closed at the time of the accident. No flight plan was filed for the accident flight. FLIGHTCREW PERFORMANCE: The flightcrew was properly certificated and qualified in accordance with applicable regulations of the Russian Federation, and had there passed instrument flight checks. However, the flightcrew did not maintain instrument currency in Haiti. No International Charter Inc. of Oregon (ICI)/Vladivostok Air (V/A) flightcrew had flown a practice or actual instrument approach in Haiti, and the operator had no relationship with any radio-navigation facility in Haiti. Consequently, the flightcrew's navigation and approach-to-landing options in accordance with instrument flight rules (IFR) were non-existent. Also limited were final escape options. When, as indicated on the CVR, the flightcrew was attempting to visually navigate in the mountains in near total darkness and fog, there was no mention of climbing into the clouds to a level above the highest terrain and navigating to an instrument approach to a landing. When interviewed following the accident, the pilots in the first flightcrew on the emergency medevac mission mentioned the possibility of climbing into overcast conditions if they encountered conditions similar to those involved in the accident; when asked how they would descend from actual meteorological conditions (IMC), they mentioned the global positioning system (GPS). That option is tenuous, however, in a mountainous country that is part of the large island of Hispaniola. According to the CVR, the accident flightcrew made no mention of GPS. THE OPERATOR: The operator (ICI) is a U.S. company. Although possessing a commercial air taxi certificate in accordance with 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135, it had limited aircraft assets, and did not own, fly, or maintain helicopters. It contracted with V/A, a Russian Federation-based owner/operator, for the helicopters, as well as piloting, training, and maintenance duties. The operator's Russian flightcrews were well-qualified in accordance with Russian Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) regulations, however, they were at a linguistic disadvantage in contracting with an operator whose primary language is English and flying in a country whose national language is French. The fact that no radio-navigation compatibility was established between the Russian flightcrews and the Haitian or United Nations authorities in Haiti demonstrates that the contract with V/A was not adequately supported by the U.S. operator or the Haitian CAA. Either entity could have assisted the Russian flightcrews by establishing a safe IMC-compatible radio-navigation relationship, including filing IFR flight plans and facilitating the scheduling and flying of practice instrument approaches in Haiti. AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL, PORT-AU-PRINCE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT: The meteorologist at MTPP did not give reports after 1700, on the day of the accident, and, according to the CAA, departed the tower following the 1700 weather report. A timely meteorological observation would have assisted the accident emergency medevac flightcrew in planning and decision-making. CAA HAITI AND UNTIED NATIONS MISSION: The Civil Aviation Administration, Haiti, governed the flight rules and oversaw the operations facilities and navigation aids in Haiti. The United Nations Mission in Haiti provided operational tasking to these flights. There was, however, no evidence that an authority came forward and volunteered to assist the Russian flightcrews regarding language, communications and navigation difficulties in the sometimes difficult transportation, logistic, and in this case, emergency medevac-tasked mission. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: About the time of the accident, passengers departing Miami International Airport (MIA), Florida for MTPP were handed written cautions that the destination airport was not fully certified. There was no evidence found that the FAA had come to Haiti and assisted in upgrading communications and radio navigation facilities at the international airport or at regional airports. Upgraded communications and navigational support may have proved useful to both flightcrews on the day and later night of the attempted lifesaving mission.

The flightcrew's inability to maintain visual contact with mountainous terrain in night, instrument meteorological conditions. Contributing to the accident was a lack of preparation and support for difficult flight conditions, including lack of coordination between the U.S. operator, its Russian flightcrew and aircraft-owner partner, United Nations tasking authorities, and the Haitian civil aviation authority.