Honolulu International Airport
Aircraft Accident/Incident Report

Honolulu, Hawaii 96819
Thursday, August 7, 1997 19:35 HST

After maintenance completed troubleshooting and the aircraft taxied out for the final time, the aircraft had taxied 11.3 miles within a 3-hour period. There was no temperature gauge or tabular data available that could have informed the crew that heat buildup resulting from taxi distance was now at a level that potentially threatened the integrity of the tires. During the takeoff roll, the 3F tire exploded, resulting in vibration, shudder, and yaw. The sudden instability, combined with a phantom C1 cargo door light, caused the Captain to abort. The abort was initiated about Vr (165 knots) with approximately 6,000 feet of runway remaining. As the aircraft came to a stop, the nose wheels were 164 feet short of the overrun area for runway 8R. A brake fire began while the aircraft was stopping and the captain directed an emergency evacuation. The 2R and 4R doors failed to open, and the 4L and 3L doors were not used due to their proximity to the fire and smoke. The 4R door was jammed by a broken piece of backboard, and the 2R door malfunctioned due to a partially broken counterbalance spring. The flight attendant who attempted to open the 2R door did not attempt to manually lift the door. All evacuations were made through the 1L, 1R, 2L, and 3R doors. Firefighters had difficulty communicating with the flight crew and in verifying the total number onboard because the airline's passenger count does not include lap children. A total of 56 passengers and 2 flight attendants were treated for minor injuries, while 1 passenger received a broken ankle. All injuries were attributed to the use of the slides. Passengers failed to follow flight attendants and attempted to evacuate with their carryons. The airline did not effectively supervise the passengers after the evacuation and several began walking toward an active runway. An inspection of the 3R tire showed bead separation had occurred. The estimated bead temperatures during the takeoff roll reached between 350 and 400 degrees Fahrenheit. The bead begins to degrade between 250 and 280 degrees Fahrenheit.

the cumulative distance taxied immediately prior to takeoff that precipitated an excessive heat buildup in the tires and resulted in the bead separation of a single tire during the takeoff roll. The absence of cockpit procedures/directives or monitoring equipment to identify this condition was a factor in the accident. Contributing to the accident was the unavailability of two emergency exits due to the malfunction of the 2R and 4R emergency doors