Larandia Army Base Airport
Aircraft Accident/Incident Report

Larandia Colombia
Sunday, February 6, 2000 9:05 EST

On the first mission, the pilot was forced to return to base, because the right engine chip detector light came on during the spray run. Maintenance personnel checked the airplane, and after the maintenance was performed it was revealed that the chip detector was found to have some fuzz on the probe. The engine was run, all checks of the engine were normal, and the aircraft was placed back into service. Just after takeoff, on the second mission, the pilot of N474AW reported to the pilot of the lead aircraft, that he was having problems, that he had lost power on No. 2 engine (right), that he could not maintain altitude and said, "it's going in with me." The lead pilot saw him eject from the aircraft, witnessed the fireball as the aircraft impacted in rising terrain, and saw the parachute open, but no seat separation. The pilot of N474AW said, "...the first indication that [he] got was that I felt the airplane start to yaw a little bit...[the] right engine was starting to spool down...[he] reached up and hit the hydraulic dump, to dump the [internal] load." He did not dump the external wing tanks, as is called for in the emergency engine failure checklist. He said "...[he] could [not] get the prop to feather...it was still slowly dying and it wasn't just a catastrophic failure...it was just like it was a slow dying process...and the airplane wouldn't climb...and the prop still wasn't in the feather...I was still flying into what I believed to be rising terrain I couldn't gain any altitude...I determined that I wasn't going to make it, that the airplane was going to wind up in [a] ditch. The pilot described checks he performed on the right engine, but did not mention anything about adding power to the left engine, as called for in item number one of the emergency engine failure check list. The pilot then elected to eject from the airplane. The maximum gross weight for the accident aircraft was 15,000 pounds. On the accident flight the calculated gross weight was 15,500 pounds. After dumping the internal load the calculated weight at impact was 13,056 pounds. According to item # 3, of the engine failure checklist, "External stores and Hooper load...JETTISON, AS REQUIRED." The external load was not jettisoned. Teardown and examinations of both engines and both propellers did not reveal any discrepancies. The calculated density altitude (DA) at the time of the accident was 2,540 feet. A simulated flight in an OV-10D was conducted, in an attempt to duplicate the accident flight. In the opinion of the two pilots that performed the tests, "...It is very possible...an OV-10 configured similarly as [the test airplane]...could perform safely and accomplish a climb if appropriate emergency procedures [as] outlined in [the] OV-10...Pilot's Pocket Checklist are employed...if the same procedures are followed in the checklist...regarding jettison of 'external stores and hopper load, drag index would be reduced to 50. With reduced drag index, performance would exponentially increase."

A loss of power in the right engine due to undetermined reasons and the pilot's failure to maintain control of the airplane. Factors in this accident were; the pilot did not perform a weight and balance calculation, (airplane overweight at takeoff); the pilot's failure to follow the emergency checklist, and not jettisoning the external load.