Kansas City International Airport
Aircraft Accident/Incident Report

Parkville, Missouri 64151
Monday, June 12, 2006 19:11 CDT

The airplane experienced an in-flight break-up during a visual approach to runway 01L. Radar data indicated the airplane crossed the flight path twice of a Boeing 737 that was landing on parallel runway 01R. The first time N292HH crossed the path of the Boeing 737 was about 1910:48 at an altitude of about 3,900 feet msl at an airspeed of 158 KCAS. The Boeing 737 had been at the same geographic point approximately 2-minutes and 9-seconds prior, at an altitude of about 5,500 feet msl. The second time N292HH crossed the flight path of the Boeing 737 was about 1911:25 at an altitude of about 3,300 feet msl at an airspeed of 183 KCAS. The Boeing 737 had been at the same geographic point approximately 1-minute 55-seconds prior at an altitude of 3,900 feet msl. The Boeing was on a north-northwesterly heading at the time and N292HH was on a northwesterly heading. After crossing the flight path N292HH continued to the west of the Boeing 737's path. The last radar contact with N292HH was at a point 0.32 miles west of the flight path of the Boeing 737. The last radar contact was at 1911:34 at an altitude of 3,128 feet msl with an airspeed of 183 KCAS. All of the wreckage was located in one open field. The left wing, both the left and right sides of the stabilator, along with portions of the right wing flap and aileron separated in-flight. According to the Pilot's Operating Handbook the never exceed speed (Vne) for N292HH was listed as being 189 KCAS. The handbook showed the maximum structural cruising speed as 165 KCAS. The design maneuvering speed (Va) was listed as being 132 KCAS at 3,600 pounds and 104 KCAS at 2,230 pounds. The inboard sections of the left and right sides of the stabilator along with the separated section of the left wing spar were sent to the NTSB Material Laboratory for examination where it was determined that all of the separations were as a result of overload. FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 90-23F addresses Aircraft Wake Turbulence. AC 90-23F states, "Flight tests have shown that the vortices from larger (transport category) aircraft sink at a rate of several hundred feet per minute, slowing their descent and diminishing in strength with time and distance behind the generating aircraft. Pilots should fly at or above the preceding aircraft's flight path, altering course as necessary to avoid the area behind and below the generating aircraft." AC 90-23F also states, "WHETHER OR NOT A WARNING OR INFORMATION HAS BEEN GIVEN, HOWEVER, THE PILOT IS EXPECTED TO ADJUST AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS AND FLIGHT PATH AS NECESSARY TO PRECLUDE SERIOUS WAKE ENCOUNTERS." According to the hourly weather observations taken prior to and after the accident the winds were from the northeast between 9 and 10 knots.

The pilot's improperly planned approach which resulted in the encounter with wake turbulence while the airplane's airspeed exceeded maneuvering speed. This encounter resulted in the subsequent loss of aircraft control and the in-flight separation of the left and right sides of the stabilator and the left wing.