Aircraft Accident/Incident Report

New York, New York 10001
Saturday, July 7, 2007 16:51 EDT

NTSB Narrative Summary Released at Completion of Accident

The helicopter was being operated on a revenue sightseeing flight when the accident occurred. Approximately 8 minutes into the flight, about 350-400 feet above the Hudson River while on an approach to land, a 20-inch section of the composite main rotor blade trailing portion, aft of the spar, fractured from the rest of the blade. The pilot reported an immediate decay in main rotor speed with a prominent and abnormal vibration. She also saw a piece of debris, most likely the liberated piece from the main rotor blade, fly from the left rear of the helicopter forward, past the cabin. She made an emergency autorotation onto the water after activating the emergency float system. The helicopter landed upright on its floats; however, the main rotor blades struck the water and the tail boom, resulting in substantial damage to the tail boom. The occupants were rescued by boaters and were not injured. Detailed examination of the helicopter revealed no evidence of flight control system component failures or malfunctions other than the main rotor blade fracture. The main rotor blades (part number 355A-11-0030) were manufactured from glass fiber reinforced composite material with a foam core. From the leading edge to trailing edge of the blade, the blade is constructed with a spar, wedge-shaped foam core, trailing edge roving, and trailing edge tab sandwiched between skin layers and skin reinforcement layers. The skin, skin reinforcement, and trailing edge tab layers are made with glass fabric reinforcement. The trailing edge roving is made of unidirectional glass fibers aligned approximately parallel with the spanwise direction of the blade. The main rotor blade that fractured was examined at the manufacturer’s facility with oversight by France's Bureau of Investigation and Analysis (BEA), and results of the examination were reviewed by the NTSB Materials Laboratory. The National Transportation Safety Board Materials Laboratory also examined sectioned pieces of the blue and yellow main rotor blades submitted by Eurocopter. Physical and microscopic examination of the main rotor blade showed that the fracture was due to fatigue cracks that initiated near the trailing edge of the blade near blade station 1300. It was discovered that the fatigue cracking most likely occurred due to out-of-specification deviations in the alignment of the trailing edge roving fibers within a transition region where the trailing edge roving shifts toward the trailing edge and where skin reinforcement layers end. In the areas of the deviations, the unidirectional fibers of the roving were not properly aligned with the spanwise direction of the blade, likely resulting in localized changes in stiffness at the trailing edge. With this type of fiber misalignment, some of the longitudinal stresses normally carried by the roving layers would be shed to adjacent skin and trailing edge tab areas, which can result in fatigue cracking in these adjacent layers. The undamaged fracture features in the trailing edge roving of the blue main rotor blade section revealed fiber fractures with mirror fracture surfaces across the fiber diameters indicating they were substantially weakened when they fractured. The mirror fractures in the fibers could be evidence of progressive fracture through the trailing edge roving due to fatigue or environmental attack. The fracture surface overall was relatively rough and did not form a flat plane typical of fatigue fracture in tension, such as observed in some areas of the skin. However, some of the fibers had a step at one side or both sides of the fracture that could suggest a mixed mode of loading including tension and transverse shear, which could theoretically explain the overall roughness of the fractures. Also, as cracking progresses the matrix material surrounding the fibers will crack, allowing environmental exposure that could potentially weaken the fibers. The fractographic evidence indicates the trailing edge roving was likely significantly weaker than expected. The weakening of the trailing edge roving fibers could occur due to mechanical damage to the surfaces of the fiber during the fatigue cracking process or could be due to an environmental attack of the fibers as cracking progressed. In either case, the strength of individual fibers was less than expected in a large area of the trailing edge roving. The total extent to which the trailing edge roving was weakened is unknown due to post-fracture damage and the unknown extent to which the trailing edge roving might have cracked before final fracture. In previous cases of skin cracking, an intact trailing edge roving was required to maintain crack stability. In this case however, the evidence shows the trailing edge roving was likely significantly weaker than expected. The previous cases cannot be used as evidence for crack stability in this case due to the weakened condition of the trailing edge roving. Given the extent of cracking in the skin and evidence of weakening in the trailing edge roving, it is likely that the cracking at the trailing edge of the blue blade had proceeded to an extent to cause fracture of the blade. The deviation in the trailing edge roving fibers occurred during the manufacture of the accident blade and it is likely that the trailing edge fibers shifted during the curing process. The skin layers of the blades are somewhat translucent after curing, and manufacturing records showed that the inspector who performed the visual examination after curing flagged the transition area of this blade for a radiographic inspection. It is possible that the inspector observed an anomaly in the trailing edge roving; however, the out-of-specification deviations in the trailing edge roving were not detected by the radiographic examination. A record search by the blade manufacturer of 9,761 similar blades revealed that one other blade had been flagged for radiographic inspection near blade station 1300 during visual examination and subsequently passed radiographic inspection. That blade was returned to the manufacturer’s facility and examined. The blade was sectioned, and the trailing edge roving showed no significant deviations from the as-designed position. The two other blades from the accident helicopter were also examined at the manufacturer. The trailing edge roving in these blades did not show any significant deviations from the as-designed position. The main rotor blade was rated for a service life of 20,000 hours and the fracture/separation occurred after about 8,077 hours. The manufacturer stated that prior to this event there had been no reported similar main rotor blade failures.

NTSB Probable Cause Narrative

The fatigue fracture and in-flight separation of a 20-inch section of the blue composite main rotor blade trailing edge, aft of the spar, due to inadequate manufacture, and the manufacturer’s subsequent failure to detect an out-of-specification deviation in the rotor blade’s trailing edge roving.

Event Information

Type of Event Accident
Event Date 7/7/2007
Event Day of the Week Saturday
Time of Event 1651
Event Time Zone Eastern Daylight Time
Event City New York
Event State NEW YORK
Event Country --
Zipcode of the event site 10001
Event Date Year 2007
Event Date Month 7
MidAir Collision Indicator No
On Ground Collision occurred ? No
Event Location Latitude 404709N
Event Location Longitude 0735930W
Event Location Airport --
Event Location Nearest Airport ID --
Indicates whether the acc/inc occurred off or on an airport Off Airport/Airstrip
Distance from airport in statute miles --
Degrees magnetic from airport --
Airport Elevation --
Weather Briefing Completeness --
Investigator's weather source Weather Observation Facility
Time of the weather observation 1651 Eastern Daylight Time
Direction of event from weather observation facility (degrees) --
Weather Observation Facility ID LGA
Elevation of weather observation facility 21
Distance of event from weather observation facility (units?) --
Time Zone of the weather observation EDT
Lighting Conditions Day
Lowest Ceiling Height 7500
Lowest Non-Ceiling Height --
Sky/Lowest/Cloud Conditions --
Sky Condition for Lowest Ceiling Broken
Visibility Runway Visual Range (Feet) --
Visibility Runway Visual Value (Statute Miles) --
Visibility (Statute Miles) 10
Air Temperature at event time (in degrees celsius) 31
Dew Point at event time (in degress fahrenheit) 12
Wind Direction (degrees magnetic) 270
Variable Wind Indicator Wind direction could be determined
Wind Speed (knots) 13
Wind Velocity Indicator --
Wind Gust Indicator Not Gusting
Wind Gust (knots) --
Altimeter Setting at event time (in. Hg) 29.82
Density Altitude (feet) --
Intensity of Precipitation --
METAR weather report --
Event Highest Injury None
On Ground, Fatal Injuries --
On Ground, Minor Injuries --
On Ground, Serious Injuries --
Injury Total Fatal --
Injury Total Minor --
Injury Total None 8
Injury Total Serious --
Injury Total All --
Investigating Agency NTSB
NTSB Docket Number (internal use) 27230
NTSB Notification Source Local Authorities
NTSB Notification Date Jul 7 2007 12:00AM
NTSB Notification Time --
Fiche Number and/or location -used to find docket information --
Date of most recent change to record Jul 29 2010 11:21AM
User who most recently changed record lema
Basic weather conditions Visual Meteorological Cond
FAA District Office Saddle Brook, NJ

Aircraft Involved

Aircraft #1

Aircraft Registration Number N453AE
NTSB Number MIA07FA116
Missing Aircraft Indicator --
Federal Aviation Reg. Part Part 91: General Aviation
Type of Flight Plan filed Company VFR
Flight plan Was Activated? Yes
Damage Substantial
Aircraft Fire None
Aircraft Explosion None
Aircraft Manufacturer's Full Name EUROCOPTER
Aircraft Model EC 130 B4
Aircraft Series Identifier --
Aircraft Serial Number 3487
Certified Max Gross Weight 5350
Aircraft Category Helicopter
Aircraft Registration Class --
Aircraft is a homebuilt? No
Flight Crew Seats --
Cabin Crew Seats --
Passenger Seats --
Total number of seats on the aircraft 8
Number of Engines 1
Fixed gear or retractable gear Fixed
Aircraft, Type of Last Inspection AAIP
Date of Last Inspection Jun 23 2007 12:00AM
Airframe hours since last inspection 85
Airframe Hours 8077
ELT Installed Yes
ELT Activated No
ELT Aided Location of Event Site No
ELT Type C91-A
Aircraft Owner Name MERIDIAN CONSULTING CO INC
Aircraft Owner Street Address PO BOX 1338
Aircraft Owner City LINDEN
Aircraft Owner State NJ
Aircraft Owner Country USA
Aircraft Owner Zipcode 07036-0004
Operator is an individual? No
Operator Name LIBERTY HELICOPTERS INC
Operator Same as Owner? No
Operator Is Doing Business As --
Operator Address Same as Owner? No
Operator Street Address P.O. Box 1338
Operator City Linden
Operator State NJ
Operator Country USA
Operator Zip code 07036
Operator Code MHIA
Owner has at least one certificate Yes - certificate holder
Other Operator of large aircraft? No
Certified for Part 133 or 137 Operation --
Operator Certificate Number MHIA082G
Indicates whether an air carrier operation was scheduled or not --
Indicates Domestic or International Flight --
Operator carrying Pax/Cargo/Mail --
Type of Flying (Per_Bus / Primary) Other Work Use
Second Pilot on Board No
Departure Point Same as Event No
Departure Airport Code JRA
Departure City New York
Departure State NY
Departure Country USA
Departure Time 1643
Departure Time Zone EDT
Destination Same as Local Flt dest & departure same, accident can occur anywhere
Destination Airport Code JRA
Destination City New York
Destination State NY
Destination Country USA
Specific Phase of Flight Landing - flare/touchdown
Report sent to ICAO? --
Evacuation occurred --
Date of most recent change to record Jul 26 2010 3:15PM
User who most recently changed record kenj
Since inspection or accident Time of Accident
Event Location Runway Number and Location N/A
Runway Length --
Runway Width --
Sight Seeing flight Yes
Air Medical Flight No
Medical Flight --